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This case comes t o this
court on appeal from a
judgment by Judge I.N.
Decisive. It forces us t o

An invitation to relive
the agonies of yesteryear by taking an
examination question,
euen a bn'ef one, may
seem easy to refuse.
Admitting that the
subject & Civil
Procec ' rre may seal the
hue. _ . ' this question
tm'ggers a re@x that
should be common to
all lawyers. Try it. *A
thinking about the
question - ifyou
frame your answer
without writing it out,
less than 20 minutes
wiUdb -go on to the
explanation of the
question's ongin and
my own answer.

consider fundamental

final
exam 1

questions regarding the
nature of the burden of
persuasion i n a civil
action and the
factfinding duties of a
district judge when a

- EDWARD He
Thomas M. cooley
Professor o f Law

case is tried t o the court
-

without a jury.

Victim sued Driver, claiming that Driver struck
Victim's automobile when Driver drove Drivefs automobile
through a red light at an intersection. Victim testified that
the traffic signal was green for Victim, and produced an
apparently disinterested witness, Green, who also testified
that the signal was green for Victim. Driver testified that
the light was green for Driver, and produced an apparently
disinterested witness, Rouge, who also testified that the
signal was green for Driver.
Judge Decisive, faced with two witnesses on each
side of the color-of-the-signal issue, announced that he
could not find any reason i n the demeanor of the witnesses
or the circumstances of the accident to find the witnesses
for Vm
cit
more persuasive than the witnesses for Driver.
The evidence was i n "equipoise." Reasoning that Victim has
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the light was red for Driver, Judge Decisive found that Driver
was not negligent and entered judgment for Driver.
On appeat, Victim argues that when there i s a conflict i n direct testimony a judge or jury cannot avoid the
responsibility to decide by simply concluding that all witnesses are equally credible. Victim urges that it i s not
enough to conclude that it would be reasonable to believe
either Victim's witnesses or Driver's witnesses; instead, the
court i s responsible to choose which witnesses to believe,
difficult that task may be.

L

evidence was in equipoise and that the burden o

Finish the
,cO,vfifs

A

appeals responded that this determination was
not a finding of fact. Equipoise is possible only
when dealing with the inferences to be drawn
from circumstantial evidence. A direct conflict of
testimony must be resolved one way or the other

the court of appeals
is bound by the
"clearly erroneous"
standard of review
and whether Judge
Decisive properly
understood his
responsibilities as
finder offact.
_-
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The evidence offered by both sides
constituted direct, not cifcumstantia1,
evidence, and a factfinding required a choice
between the two contradictory versions of
events. Because the district court did not
make such a choice, its determination that
the evidence is 'in equipoise' is entitled to
no deference.
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See next page.
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This passage served as inspiration because it
triggered an automatic response: "That cannot b
right, can it?" The question seemed worth about
20 minutes. Following a long personal custom, I
did not particularly think about the issue until
e examination had been administered. Then I
ewted 18 minutes to writing my own answer,
not as a model of what to expect from the
student answers but as a framework for thinking
further. Rather than protect the innocent me it is presented without change. None of
the answers, mine or the students', persuaded me
to agree w i t h the court. But students have the
same happy p o s l i ~ na$ the court it makes no
difference whether I agree with them. Unlike the
court, howewrF.students are graded on the
inventiveness of their answers in comparison to
the whale set of a m m r s . On the whole, they
did welL
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MY 18 MINUTE
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The beguiling argument
made by Victim need not
detain us long. He is wrong.
Under Civil Rule 52 (a),
ings made by a district
court sitting without a jury can
be reviewed only for clear
error. We could escape this
lirmt only if there were no
f m h g at all; and if there were
no fin&ng, our duty would be
to remand with directions that
,he trial judge make a finding.
:Ne are in no position to make
m original finding. The role of
(he court of appeals does not
~roperlyextend to oripal
ctfinding even when the trial
ourt acted on an entirely
mitten record, all of whch is
~eforethe court of appeals. The
(mendmentof Rule 52 (a) that
wtrenches application of the
:lear-error rule to findings
-made on a written record
,mkes that clear if ever there
-wereany doubt.
: Here we do have a fmding.
-4nd it is a finding based on
pral testimony The trial judge
;g explicit in seelung to take
:zccount of the witnesses'
jemeanor. Duty has been
:ended to. There is no means to
@able us to find clear error

whether the truth lies in the
mouths of Victim and Green 'or
Driver and Rouge.
The only remaining basis for
w~timbargument is thai
although we qannot find clear
error, we can find as a matter of
law that Judge Decisive
misunderstood the nature of
the factfinderb duties. The
argument that the evidence
somehow "must" preponderate
in favor of one party or the
other fails to appreciate the
nature of the preponderanceof-the-evidence test.
First, even if we take the
preponderance test literally, in
its Gsual forms of statement, it
allows for precise equipoise.
The plaintiff in ths case must
persuade the court that the
light was red; many courts
would say that the plaintiff
must show that it was more
probably red than not red. That
is all that it says. It does mean
that if the plaintiff fads to do
this, the court can award half
damages because,it finds equal
possibilities that the light was
red and that it was green. The
famous Louisiana case in which
the trial judge got reversed for
awarding one cow and one calf

burden of persuasion has
reduced unavoidable
uncertainty to a point that
justifies action in favor of that
parg It requires acceptance of
uncertainty, not rejection of
uncertainty
So to the question whether a
judge must f&d some excuse to
believe one set of witnesses
rather than anather. Thm
simply is no reason why one
set must be more persuasive.
Our abhty to d e t e ~the,
truth is limited, gn it is a wise
-not a lazy -judge who
understands that the
shortcomings of our
assessmengof demeanor may
vevwell lead to the conclusion
that no sufficient reason can be
Zund to believe the plaintiff's
witnesses over the defendant3
witnesses. There is no need to
force the judge to say the
plainWs witnesses are less
truthful, or not as persuasive.
There is no indication that the
judge has surrendered without
conscientiously attempting to
.find a reason to credit one or
more witnesses more than
others. That conscientious
attempt is all that is required.

;he demeanor of live witnesses

a reason to tip the balance, is a

How did you do?

~;:onflict.(Of course it is
~ossiblethat the traffic signal
;vas not workmg, showing red
:n both directions; if that were
he situation, Victim still would
lose because Driver did not
inter the interesecton on a
yeen light.) We cannot say that
~twas clear error to conclude
:hat demeanor did not furnish
my satisfactory basis to find

reasons, both abstract and
practical, we avoid splitting the
difference. We seek to be right,
not to compromise the truth.
Pursuit of this lofty ideal will
make the parties and
factfinders more careful in
approaching the tasks of
presentation and decision.
Second, the preponderance
test should not be taken
literally What it requires is a
rough, intuitive sense of
whether the party assigned the
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That's. it.

